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Public Contracts, 14-1-1 to 14-1-4. 
Private Contracts, 14-2-1, 14-2-2. 
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
Section 14-1-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen_ 
14-1-1.1. Security in connection with bids for doing work or furnishing mater-
ials and supplies-Forfeiture. 
14-1-2. Action on bond-Parties-Intervention-Interpleader-Limitation of 
action. 
14-1-3. Failure to require bond-Direct liability-Limitation of action. 
14-1-4. Attorneys' fees allowed. 
14-1-1. Bond to protect mechanics, and materialmen.-Every person en-
tering into a contract for the construction or alteration of, or addition to, 
any public work, building, structure or improvement shall, before the 
work under any such contract is commenced, be required to furnish a good 
and sufficient bond for the faithful performance of such contract, and 
further conditioned that the contractor will promptly make payment to all 
persons supplying labor or materials used in the prosecution of the work. 
When such contract is made with the state, or with a state institution, 
board or commission which is not a body politic or corporate, the state shall 
be named as the obligee in such bond, and when made with a county, 
municipal corporation, board of education or other body politic, the same, 
as the case may be, shall be named as the obligee. 
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch. 
36, § 2; C. L. 1917, § 3753; R. S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 17-1-1. 
Compiler's Note. 
This statute originated as Laws 1905, ch. 
87, and was § 1400x of the Compiled Laws 
of 1907 (now repealed). 
Cross-References. 
Cities and towns, contracts by, 10-7-20. 
Counties, general power to make con-
tracts, 17-4-3. 
State institutions, contracts by, 64-1-3, 
64-1-4. 
1. Origin of statute. 
Utah statute is similar to that of the 
United States on the same subject, and 
was undoubtedly taken from the federal 
act. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. District Court 
of Millard County, 90 U. 552, 557, 63 P. 
2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250. 
2. Purpose and construction. 
This statute is highly remedial for the 
benefit of and to provide security for all 
persons who furnish labor and materials 
on public work. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. 
District Court of Millard County, 90 U. 
552, 556, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250. 
This statute is not for the benefit of 
the contractor but is for the benefit of 
the state, the creditors and the surety. 
State for Use and Benefit of McBride v. 
Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 
341. 
3. Necessity for furnishing bond. 
Under this section anyone interested 
may demand that a bond be executed or 
1·equired, and thereafter a refusal to do 
so would be willful. Joseph Nelson Supply 
Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047. 
Company contracting with executive de-
partment of city for erection and con-
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struction of electric power plant and dis-
tribution syst0m, in accordance with ini-
tiated ordinance, must furnish bond for 
performance and completion of contract 
and prompt payment of all persons supply-
ing labor or materials used in prosecution 
of the work. Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Provo City, 94 U. 203, 74 P. 2d 1191. 
(Moffat, J., and Folland, C. J., dissenting.) 
4. Obligee, necessity of naming in bond. 
The second sentence of this section was 
no doubt intended to provide a means for 
any state institution to receive the benetit 
of a surety bond when it has not the legal 
capacity to do so on its own behalf. 
Moreover, the Utah state building com-
mjssion is a "body politic and corporate" 
in contemplation of law; accordingly, 
surety bond was not void because of its 
failure to name the state of Utah as the 
obligee. Moreover, bonding company may 
be estopped to deny liability. Utah State 
Bldg. Comm. for Use and Benefit of Moun-
tain States Supply Co. v. Great American 
Indemnity Co., 105 U. 11, 140 P. 2d 763, 
considering at some length the general 
question as to who is a body politic and 
corporate. 
5. Liability for failure to exact bond. 
Under a former section it was held that 
the failure of a school district to require 
such a bond from a contractor did not 
render it liable to one to whom the con-
tractor assigned moneys due under the con-
tract and whose right to such moneys was 
made subordinate to claims for labor and 
materials, for the reason that bond was 
not intended for its benefit. The words 
"shall be required" are no stronger than if 
the phrase "is hereby required" had been 
used. South High School Dist. v. McMil-
lan Paper & Supply Co., 49 U. 477, 164 P. 
1041; Joseph Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 
49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047, applying Laws 
1909, ch. 68. 
This section merely requires contractor 
to execute the bond mentioned therein, 
but does not impose the duty upon any 
particular person to exact such a bond. 
New York Blower Co. v. Carbon County 
High School, 50 U. 342, 167 P. 670. 
Under this section a school district is 
not liable to parties, supplying labor and 
material to construct high school building, 
for failure to require the bond mentioned 
herein. New York Blower Co. v. Carbon 
County High School, 50 U. 342, 167 P. 
670, following Joseph Nelson Supply Co. 
v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047. 
6. Liability on bond. 
Under this section, the school trustees 
are not personally liable for failure to 
require the bond mentioned herein. New 
York Blower Co. v. Carbon County High 
School, 50 U. 342, 167 P. 670. 
7. Remedies. 
Formerly a person who furnished ma-
terials to con tractor for construction of a 
high school building had an adequate 
remedy by bringing an action against the 
high school before money arising out of 
contract was paid either to contractor or 
on his 01·der. New York Blower Co. v. 
Carbon County High School, 50 U. 342, 
167 P. 670, applying Comp. Laws 1907, 
§ 1400x, now repealed. 
Collateral References. 
Statese=:>101. 
81 C.J.S. States § 119. 
Bond of contractor, 43 Am. Jur. 879, 
Public Works and Contracts § 137 et seq. 
Acceptance of construction work as re-
leasing contractors or sureties on bond 
conditioned for performance of construc-
tion contract or guaranteeing completed 
work, 109 A. L. R. 625. 
Claim under subcontract by which sub-
contractor agrees to furnish a man and 
truck, or other specified instrumentality, 
at an unapportioned compensation, as 
within contractor's bond conditioned for 
payment of claims for labor, 79 A. L. R. 
1253. 
Clothing, food, or lodging for laborers 
as covered by contractor's bond, 46 A. L. 
R. 511, 65 A. L. R. 260. 
Concrete forms, material or labor em-
ployed in construction of, as basis of me-
chanic's lien or claim under contractor's 
bond, 84 A. L. R. 460. 
Fuel furnished contractor or subcon-
tractor as within coverage of bond to pay 
for materials furnished, 96 A. L. R. 553. 
Gasoline and oil as within contractor's 
bond, 91 A. L. R. 1027. 
Injuries to persons or property, claims 
for, against contractor's bond, 67 A. L. R. 
990. 
Insurance premiums other than work-
men's compensation insm·ance, contractor's 
bond as covering, 129 A. L. R. 1087. 
Labor and materials furnished to sub-
contractor: 
-as within coverage of principal cou-
tracto1·'s bond for public improvement, 70 
A. L. R. 308, 111 A. L. R. 311. 
-existence and extent of lien or claim 
for, against money due principal contractor 
for public improvement, 112 A. L. R. 815. 
-liability of surety on subcontractor's 
bond to principal contractor for public im-
provement or to his surety, in respect of 
claims for, 117 A. L. R. 662. 
Loss of profit of subcontractor, laborer 
or materialman as within coverage of con-
tractor's bond, 119 A. L. R. 1281. 
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Medical or hospital services to em-
ployees, claim for, as within coverage of 
contractor's bond, 81 A. L. R. 1051. 
Money loaned or advanced to contractor 
as within coverage of bond of building 
or construction contractor, 127 A. L. R. 
974, 164 A. L. R. 782. 
Noncompliance with statutory require-
ment as to approval of bond, right of 
sureties to take advantage of, 77 A. L. R. 
1479. 
One who contracts with, or furnishes 
labor or material to, public contractor's 
surety after latter has taken over work, 
right in respect of pa1-t of contract price 
retained by public agency, 122 A. L. R. 
511. 
Paving contract or contractor's bond in 
respect of the contractor's obligation as 
to repairs, construction of, 72 A. L. R. 644. 
Payments or advancements to building 
contrnctor by obligee as affecting rights as 
between obligee and surety on contractor's 
bond, 127 A. L. R. 10. 
"Public work," what constitutes within 
statute relating to contractor's bond, 101 
A. L. R. 565. 
Rental of equipment as within contrac-
tor's bond, 44 A. L. R. 381. 
Repairs or replacements of machinery, 
tools, and equipment as within contractor's 
bond, 67 A. L. R. 1232. 
Statutory conditions, effect of, provision 
in public contractor's bond excluding, 77 
A. L. R. 166, 118 A. L. R. 57. 
Statutory conditions prescribed for pub-
lic contractor's bond as part of bond which 
does not in terms include them, 89 A. L. 
R. 446. 
Surety on contractor's bond, and as-
signee of money to become due on con-
tract, right as between, 76 A. L. R. 917. 
Surety who completes contract, right to 
moneys earned by contractor but unpaid 
before default, 45 A. L. R. 379, 134 A. L. 
R. 738, 164 A. L. R. 613. 
Validity of condition in bond of con-
tractor for public work, beyond require-
ments of statute or ordinance, with re-
spect to claims of third person, 18 A. L. R. 
1227. 
Workmen's compensation insurance pre-
miums as within coverage of contractor's 
bond, 102 A. L. R. 135, 164 A. L. R. 1468. 
14-1-1.1. Security in connection with bids for doing work or furnishing 
mate-rials and supplies-Forfeiture.-Any person, firm, partnership, cor-
poration, or association bidding to do work or furnish materials and sup-
plies for the state, or for any political subdivision thereof, may, if the 
regulations of an institution, board, commission, or department of the 
state or the regulations of any political subdivision so authorize, be re-
quired to furnish and file security with said bid in the form of cash, certi-
fied check, or cashier's check or a surety bond in an amount specified in 
the notice of the advertisement calling for such bid; provided that such 
security shall not exceed five per cent of the amount bid. The state, or 
any political subdivision thereof, upon refusal by the contractor to enter 
into a contract and to furnish a payment and performance bond after 
having been notified that said contractor is the lowest responsible bidder 
will then require said contractor to forfeit to the state or its political sub-
division the amount of the security as liquidated damages for the con-
tractor's failure to produce a performance or payment bond and to enter 
into the contract as anticipated by the advertisement for bid. 
History: C. 1953, 14-1-1.1, enacted by 
L. 1953, ch. 23, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act enacting a new section to be 
known as section 14-1-1.1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, authorizing the state of 
Utah and its political subdivisions to 
require that security be furnished and 
filed in connection with bids for doing 
work or furnishing materials and supplies; 
and providing for the forfeiture of such 
security under cei·tain conditions. 
Collateral References. 
States(s:;:;>101. 
Claims within protection of obligation 
for payment of laborers, 43 Am. Jur. 921 
et seq., Public Works and Contracts § 181 
et seq. 
14-1-2. Action on bond-Parties-Intervention-Inte,rpleader-Limita-
tion of action.-Any person who has furnished labor or materials for the 
construction or alteration of, or addition to, any public building, work, 
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structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, may 
intervene in any action commenced by the obligee or other person on 
the bond of the contractor and have his claim adjudicated therein, subject 
to the priority of the claim of the obligee. If the full amount of such bond 
is insufficient to satisfy all claims, then, after payment of the amount due 
the obligee, the remainder shall be distributed pro rata among the parties 
establishing claims. If no action is brought by the obligee within six 
months from the completion and final settlement, or abandonment, of the 
contract, then any person who has supplied labor or materials shall, upon 
application therefor, be furnished with a certified copy of the original 
contract and bond, upon which he shall have a right of action, and may sue 
the contractor and his surety, for his own benefit, in the name of the 
obligee, in any court having jurisdiction in the county where the contract 
was to be performed, and may prosecute such action to final judgment and 
execution; provided, that where such action is instituted by any such credi-
tor it shall not be commenced until after the complete performance of such 
contract and final settlement thereof, or abandonment thereof, and shall 
be commenced within one year thereafter and not later; provided further, 
that only one action shall be brought upon such bond, and any creditor may 
be made, or may become, a party thereto. If the recovery upon such bond 
shall be inadequate to pay the amounts found due all of such creditors, dis-
tribution shall be made among them pro rata. In all actions instituted 
under the provisions of this chapter notice of the pendency thereof, in-
forming them of their right to intervene, shall be served upon all known 
creditors personally, and in addition thereto service of the notice shall 
be made by publication, in the same manner as is required for service 
of summons; such service to be complete at least two months before the 
expiration of the time limited for intervention by creditors. .All claimants 
and creditors who do not intervene, or assert and establish their claims, 
in such action shall be forever barred from recovery upon such bond. 
The surety upon such bond may pay into court, for distribution among 
the creditors, the amount of the penalty named in the bond, less any amount 
paid to the obligee by reason of the execution thereof, and upon so doing 
shall be relieved of any further liability. 
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch. 
36, ~ 2; C. L. 1917, § 3753; R. S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 17-1-2. 
Compiler's Note. 
This statute originated as Laws 1905, 
ch. 87, and was § 1400x of the Compiled 
Laws of 1907 (now repealed). 
1. Purpose and construction of act. 
This section, in so far as it allows "any 
person" supplying labor or materials to 
sue, is highly remedial, and must, in furth-
erance of justice, receive a liberal con-
struction and application so as to accom-
plish its real object· and purpose. Mellen 
v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P. 
130, applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 1400x, 
now repealed. 
It would seem that the rights of "any 
person" furnishing labor or mate1·ials un-
der this seetion must he determined upon 
equitable principles rather than upon strict 
legal rules. Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 
44 U. 300, 140 P. 130, applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now rnpealed, but 
which formerly was contained in the Lien 
Act. 
The purpose of the fo1·mer statute was 
to enable creditors of or claimants against 
contractor on public buildings to collect 
for work and materials furnished by them 
ratably and equitably from contractor and 
his bondsmen in all cases to full amount 
and extent of surety bond. Board of Edu-
cation of Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U. 
357, 186 P. 114. 
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2, Lien of laborers or materialmen. 
Although a workman or materialman 
cannot acquire a lien on a public building 
for labor or material furnished in the con-
struction of such building in view of 
38-1-1, he may have a preferential right to 
moneys in the hands of the public corpora-
tion to be used in the construction of the 
building under this section. Mountain 
States Supply Co. v. Nuttall-Allen Co., 63 
U. 384, 225 P. 811. 
3. Performance of contract. 
Where the contract between the con-
tractor and a materialman is silent as to 
when contractor should pay for the ma-
terials furnished for the construction of 
public building, payment is due on deliv-
ery, and interest is properly allowed ac-
cordingly. Board of Education of Granite 
School Dist. v. Southern Surety Co., 76 
U. 63, 73, 287 P. 332. 
4. Abandonment of contract. 
A contract cannot be regarded as hav-
ing been abandoned within meaning of 
this section if its terms and conditions 
were performed by surety company in-
stead of by the contractor. Mellen v. 
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P. 130. 
5. Right of action. 
It is reasonable to assume that the right 
of the claimant against the fund under 
this section does not depend upon whether 
the contractor makes any profit on the 
building or not. The action is one by 
which a fund is to be reached rather than 
one in which a personal judgment is in-
tended to be obtained against anyone. 
Mellen v. Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 
140 P. 130, applying Comp. Laws 1907, 
§ 1400x, now repealed. 
Original contractor engaged by board of 
education to do reconstruction work on 
school building, held entitled to recover 
from subcontractor, who used inferior ma-
terials in painting school, as against con-
tention that school board would not hold 
its contractor to strict accountability for 
not complying with specifications furnished 
him. Board of Education of Salt Lake 
City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186 P. 114. 
6. Limitations as to time. 
Under this section, surety company may 
extend time within which an action may 
be begun on its undertaking, and having 
done so, it cannot be heard to shift its 
position to escape liability which it as-
sumed. Board of Education of Granite 
School Dist. v. Southern Surety Co., 76 
U. 63, 71, 287 P. 332. 
The purpose of this statute is to give 
the state an opportunity to proceed first 
against the bond, and for that purpose it 
has six months' time within which to bring 
its action after completion of the work 
and final settlement as administratively 
determined by the proper officer. After 
that and within the year other claimants 
may bring suit. Campbell Bldg. Co. v. Dis-
trict Court of Millard County, 90 U. 552, 
559, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250. 
When the state has determined in its 
regular administrative order what the con-
tractor owes it, that is, what claims it 
may have against the surety, it must 
promptly assert same so as not to un-
reasonably delay other creditors. State 
for Use and Benefit of McBride v. Camp-
bell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
7. - computation of time. 
Under this section the special statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until 
the building is completed and there is a 
final settlement of the amount due under 
the contract. An erroneous final certificate 
given by the architect, which was later 
changed because of the error and a correct 
one given. cannot be said to constitute a 
"final settlement." Board of Education of 
Granite School Dist. v. Southern Surety 
Co., 76 U. 63, 69, 287 P. 332. 
The "final settlement" referred to in this 
section is the point from which time is 
computed so that after six months and 
within a year such claimants as have not 
been paid may bring an action to recover 
on the bond. The date of "final settle-
ment" is not and cannot be delayed by 
mere failure to accept the amount fixed by 
the architect or engineer in his final esti-
mate. Final settlement is quite different 
from final payment. Campbell Bldg. Co. 
v. District Court of Millard County, 90 U. 
552, 557, 63 P. 2d 255, 119 A. L. R. 250. 
Final settlement within this section does 
not mean final payment or final disposition 
of all matters under the contract but that 
the state has administratively determined 
that performance under the contract has 
been made by the contractor and has de-
termined whether or not it has any claims 
to assert against the surety because of the 
contractor's failure to perform according 
to the contract. State for Use and Benefit 
of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 
326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
In suit by a materialman on a public 
works contractor's bond, record justified 
finding that there was a final settlement 
under this statute six months prior to 
commencement of the action. State for 
Use and Benefit of McBride v. Campbell 
Bldg. Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
Six months' period of priority of right 
of state to sue, as against other creditors, 
begins to run when state has determined 
amount it considers it owes contractor, 
from which it has deducted any sum con-
tractor owes it. State for Use and Bene-
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fit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 
U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
8. - claims of creditors against con-
tractor. 
This statute deals only with actions 
against the surety, and claims of creditors 
against the contractor are not affected 
thereby, and such claims may be asserted 
at any time within the general statute of 
limitations. State for Use and Benefit of 
McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 94 U. 
326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
Final settlement under this statute could 
not be affected by the fact that the con-
tractor might not agree with the deter-
mination made by the state. State for Use 
and Benefit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. 
Co., 94 U. 326, 77 P. 2d 341. 
9. Summons and process. 
Under a somewhat similar provision it 
was held that ·the surety company became 
the alter ego of the contractor, and it was 
even held that personal service upon such 
contractor was not necessary. Mellen v. 
Vondor-Horst Bros., 44 U. 300, 140 P. 130, 
applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 1400x, now 
repealed. 
10. Notice of pendency. 
. The giving of the ~rescri~ed_ n?ti~e of 
pendency to claimants is not Jurisdiction~l, 
and a surety, when sued, may not com~lam 
that the notice given was not sufficient, 
since no prejudice can result to the surety. 
Board of Education of Granite School 
Dist. v. Southern Surety Co., 76 U. 63, 67, 
287 P. 332. 
11. Joinder of parties. 
Under a former statute, one furnishing 
materials to or doing work for a principi_i,l 
contractor in the construction or repair 
of any public work for citie~, t~wns, vil-
lages, counties, or school districts, was 
permitted to sue both the contra~tor _and 
the city, which gave _a preferential right 
to laborers and matenalmen even over an 
assignee of the contract price, a contr_ac-
tor's trustee in bankruptcy. South High 
School Dist. v. McMillan Paper & Supply 
Co., 49 U. 477, 164 P. 1041, applying Comp. 
Laws 1907, § 1400x, now repealed; Joseph 
Nelson Supply Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 
164 P. 1047; George A. Lowe & Co. v. 
Leary, 49 U. 506, 164 P. 1052. 
12. Jury trial. 
Action by board of education for use 
and benefit of subcontractor against orig-
inal contractor and his surety was one at 
law entitling party to jury trial when 
seasonably demanded in accordance with 
Code 1943, 104-23-6. Board of Education 
of Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186 
P. 114. For present law as to demand of 
jury trial, see Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 38(b). 
In action by board of education for use 
and benefit of subcontractor against orig-
inal contractor and his surety, in which 
materialman filed his complaint in inter-
vention, held that materialman having 
failed to demand jury to try issues within 
time allowed under statute, it must there-
fore be held that his legal right to jury 
trial was waived. Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City v. West, 55 U. 357, 186 
P. 114. 
13. Liability of sureties. 
Under former statute, in suit involving 
the right to unpaid contract price as be-
tween materialman and surety on bond of 
contractor constructing public school build-
ing, wherein materialman did not proceed 
against bond, but sued contractor and at-
tempted to reach balance due on contract 
by garnishment, and surety, who had paid 
out considerable sums on account of its 
liability, and to whom contract price had 
been assigned by contractor, asserted its 
superior right to fund, it was held that 
the amended statute (Laws 1917, ch. 36) 
had so changed remedy of materialman as 
to render his claim no obstacle in way of 
assignment of contract price to surety, 
and that surety was not liable for assigned 
fund since a substantial remedy was pro-
vided in amended statute for enforcement 
of any rights which subcontractor had 
under provision of statute repealed. Salt 
Lake Electric Supply Co. v. West, 54 U. 
564, 182 P. 215. 
In a subsequent decision, Salt Lake 
City v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 249 P. 810, 
49 A. L. R. 941, the court in commenting 
on the West case, cited above, stated that 
while the right of the contractor to assign 
the contract price to the surety in that 
particular case, notwithstanding the claim 
of the materialman who by statute had 
substantial but different remedy, was 
affirmed, whether surety had such an equitJ 
in contract price as would prohibit an 
assignment thereof to its prejudice by con-
tractor was not considered or decided, and 
case was no authority on that question. 
14. Subrogation of sureties. 
Surety on bond of contractor absconding 
upon completion of work, leaving unpaid 
materialmen, is entitled to unpaid portion 
of contract price remaining in hands of 
city, as against bank which, during prog-
ress of work, loaned contractor money 
upon his assignment of all sums due or to 
become due under the contract. Salt Lake 
City v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 244, 249 P. 
810, 49 A. L. R. 941. 
Surety on contractor's bond not entitled 
to be credited with payments which city 
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made to contractor and he then paid ma-
terialmen, where latter credited amounts 
received on past indebtedness of contrac-
tor incurred on previous jobs covered by 
other sureties, materialmen being unaware 
that sums received were paid by city 
under particular contract. Salt Lake City 
v. O'Connor, 68 U. 233, 244, 249 P. 810, 49 
A. L. R. 941. 
15. Priorities-Single action preferable. 
There is probably no priority between 
or among those who present their claims 
under this section. The rights of all are 
equal. All may intervene in one action 
or may bring separate actions. It would 
be preferable, however, in order to con-
serve the fund, that all should intervene 
in one action. Joseph Nelson Supply Co. 
v. Leary, 49 U. 493, 164 P. 1047; George 
A. Lowe & Co. v. Leary, 49 U. 506, 164 
P. 1052. 
16, Application of payments. 
In the absence of instruction as to ap-
plication of payments, a creditor of the 
contractor may apply moneys received by 
the latter from a public contract in pay-
ment of any item, and the surety cannot 
complain that such payments were not ap-
plied on obligations growing out of the 
performance of the public contract. Board 
of Education of Granite School Dist. v. 
Southern Surety Co., 76 U. 63, 72, 287 P. 
332; and see Salt Lake City v. O'Connor, 
68 U. 233, 237, 249 P. 810, 49 A. L. R. 941. 
Collateral References. 
Statese=:>101. 
81 C.J.S. States § 125. 
Bond of contractor, 43 Am. Jur. 879, 
Public Works and Contracts § 137 et seq. 
Construction and application of provi-
sions of statute or public contractor's 
bond as to time when action may be 
brought thereon by laborers or material-
men, 119 A. L. R. 255. 
Nature of remedy to enforce obligation 
under bond of public contractor for labor 
or material, 43 A. L. R. 561. 
Provision in public contractor's bond 
purporting to limit right of action to 
obligee as affecting laborers or material-
men, 77 A. L. R. 125, 126, 118 A. L. R. 57. 
Right of person furnishing material or 
labor to maintain action on contractor's 
bond to owner or public body, or on own-
er's bond to mortgagee, 77 A. L. R. 21, 
118 A. L. R. 57. 
14-1-3. Failure to require bond-Direct liability-Limitation of action. 
-Any county, municipal corporation, board of education, state institu-
tion, board or association which shall fail or neglect to obtain the delivery 
of a bond as herein required shall, upon demand, itself promptly make pay-
ment to all persons who have supplied materials or performed labor in 
the prosecution of the work under the contract, and any such creditor 
shall have a direct right of action upon his account against any such county, 
municipal corporation, school district, board of education, institution, 
board or association in any court having jurisdiction in the county in 
which the contract was to be performed and executed; which action must 
be commenced within one year after the complete performance and final 
settlement, or abandonment, of the contract. 
History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 1; 1917, ch. 




81 C.J.S. States § 117. 
Failure of public authorities to take 
contractor's bond as required by law as 
rendering them liable to laborers or ma-
terialmen, 64 A. L. R. 678. 
Liability of subcontractor upon bond or 
other agreement indemnifying general con-
tractor against liability for damage to per-
son or property, 143 A. L. R. 312. 
Personal liability of public officer or 
sureties on his bond for nonperformance 
or improper performance of a duty im-
posed upon a board or corporate body of 
which he is a member, 123. A. L. R. 756. 
14-1-4. Attorneys' fees allowed.-In any action brought upon bond pro-
vided for herein the prevailing party, upon each separate cause of action, 
shall recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as costs. 
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History: L. 1909, ch. 68, § 2; 1917, ch. 
36, §4; C. L.1917, §3755; R. S.1933 & 
C. 1943, 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1. 
Compiler's Note. 
The 1961 amendment deleted ", not ex-




81 C.J.S. States § 125. 
CHAPTER 2 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS 
Section 14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability. 
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialm.en.-The owner of any 
interest in land entering into a contract, involving $500 or more, for 
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, struc-
ture or improvement upon land shall, before any such work is commenced, 
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, 
with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance 
of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor 
performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to 
all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has 
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, 
structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall 
have a direct right of action against the sureties upon such bond for the 
reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not ex-
ceeding, however, in any case the prices agreed upon; which right of 
action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or 
default in the performance, of the work provided for in the contract. 
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person inter-
ested, upon request. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 1-3; C. L. 
1917, §§ 3759-3761; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-2-1. 
1. Validity and effect. 
This section is constitutional; it does 
not infringe the due process clause of the 
Constitution. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Darke, 50 U. 114, 167 P. 241, L. R. A. 
1918A, 1193. 
For obvious reasons there is nothing 
unreasonable, harsh or oppressive about 
this legislation. Rio Grande Lumber Co. 
v. Darke, 50 U. 114, 122, 167 P. 241, L. R. 
A. 1918A, 1193. 
This statute is auxiliary to our Me-
chanics/ Lien Law, and is just as much 
in aid of it as if it had been made a part 
of it and incorporated in the same chap-
ter. California did incorporate a somewhat 
similar section in its Mechanics' Lien Law. 
Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U. 
114, 124, 167 P. 241, L. R. A. 1918A, 1193. 
2. Purpose of chapter. 
The purpose of this statute is to pre-
vent owners of land from having their 
lands improved with materials and labor 
furnished and performed by third per-
sons, and thus to enhance the value of 
such lands, without becoming personally 
responsible for reasonable, value of ma-
terials and labor. Libe·rty Coal & Lumber 
Co. v. Snow, 53 U. 298, 178 P. 341. 
The bond provided for in this chapter 
appears to be for the purpose of protect-
ing the materialmen and those furnishing 
labor against nonpayment of their ac-
counts by the contractor. Bamberger Co. v. 
Certified Productions, Inc., 88 U. 194, 211, 
48 P. 2d 489. 
3. Duty to furnish bond. 
Under this section a bond may be de-
manded from the contractor to the lessee 
to protect lessee and lessor against mechan-
ics' liens. Bamberger Co. v. Certified Pro-
ductions, Inc., 88 U. 213, 53 P. 2d 1153. 
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4. Sufficiency of bond. 
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon 
contractor's faithful performance of con-
tract, and containing no express provision 
for payment of materialmen, was sufficient 
under this section to exonerate owner from 
liability, and to sustain right of material-
men to sue surety, in view of the fact that 
contract expressly required contractor to 
pay for all labor and materials. De Luxe 
Class Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144, 208 P. 2d 
1127. 
5. Leveling of land. 
Work done upon land in leveling the 
same is not an improvement upon land 
requiring the owner to obtain a bond from 
the contractor. Backus v. Hooten, 4 U. 
(2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703, 704. 
Conceding that leveling land enhances 
its value and improves its utility it does 
not follow that such leveling constituted 
an improvement upon land within this 
statute. Likewise, it would seem to be 
an unreasonable construction to hold that 
a contract for plowing, seeding, or manur-
ing of land is a contract for the construc-
tion of an improvement upon land. Backus 
v. Hooten, 4 U. (2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703 
704. ' 
6. Proof of status as materialman. 
Invoice between plaintiff and installer 
reciting that merchandise was purchased 
for resale, was not conclusive evidence 
that plaintiff was a materialman entitled 
to the benefits of this statute. Crane Co. 
v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 U. (2d) 413 
335 P. 2d 837. ' 
7. Terms of bond. 
Where the condition of the bond is 
that the surety will indemnify the owner 
if the contractor fails to pay for material 
and labor, it is not such a bond contem-
plated by this section so as to allow a 
direct action by the materialman against 
the surety, as it does not promise that 
the contractor will pay for the material 
and labor. Boise-Payette Lbr. Co. v. 
Phoenix Indemnity Co., 3 U. (2d) 150, 280 
P. 2d 448. (Dissenting opinion 3 U. (2d) 
150, 280 P. 2d 448, 451.) 
8. Unlicensed subcontractor. 
The fact that a subcontractor is un-
licensed under section 58-6-1 (since re-
pealed) will not bar his right to sue on 
a bond or directly against the owner who 
fails to require a bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 
5 U. (2d) 211, 299 P. 2d 83,7, 838. 
Collateral References. 
Mechanics' Liense::>313,. 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256. 
Bonds and insurance, 9 Am. Jur. 56, 
Building and Construction Contracts § 86 
et seq. 
Acceptance of construction work as re-
leasing contractors or sureties on bond 
conditioned for performance of construc-
tion contract or guaranteeing completed 
work, 109 A. L. R. 625. 
Clothing, food, or lodging for laborers, 
contractor's bond as covering, 46 A. L. R. 
511, 65 A. L. R. 260. 
Concrete forms, material or labor em-
ployed in construction of, as basis of 
mechanics' lien or claim under contractors' 
bond, 84 A. L. R. 460. 
Freight charges on material as within 
contractor's bond securing such claims, 30 
A. L. R. 466. 
Fuel furnished contractor or subcontrac-
tor as within coverage of bond to pay 
for materials furnished, 96 A. L. R. 553. 
Gasoline and oil as within contractor's 
bond, 91 A. L. R. 1027. 
Injuries to persons or property, claims 
for against contractor's bond, 67 A. L. R. 
990. 
Insurance premiums other than work-
men's compensation insurance, contractor's 
bond as covering, 129 A. L. R. 1087. 
Loss of profit of subcontractor, laborer, 
or materialman as within coverage of con-
tractor's bond, 119 A. L. R. 1281. 
Medical or hospital services to em-
ployees, claim for, as within coverage of 
contractor's bond, 81 A. L. R. 1051. 
Money loaned or advanced to contractor 
as within coverage of bond of building or 
construction contractor, 127 A. L. R. 974, 
164 A. L. R. 782. 
Noncompliance with statutory require-
ment as to approval of bond, right of 
sureties to take advantage of, 77 A. L. R. 
1479. 
Paving contract or contractor's bond in 
respect of the contractor's obligation as to 
repairs, construction of, 72 A. L. R. 644. 
Payments or advancements to building 
contractor by obligee as affecting rights 
as between obligee and surety on con-
tractor's bond, 127 A. L. R. 10. 
Person furnishing material or labor, 
right to maintain action on contractor's 
bond to owner or public body, or on own-
er's bond to mortgagee, 118 A. L. R. 57. 
Rental of equipment as within contrac-
tor's bond, 44 A. L. R. 381. 
Repairs or replacements of machinery, 
tools, and equipment as within contrac-
tor's bond, claims for, 67 A. L. R. 1232. 
Subcontract by which subcontractor 
agrees to furnish a man and truck or 
other specified instrumentality, at an' un-
apportioned compensation, claim under as 
within contractor's bond conditioned 'for 
payment of claims for labor, 79 A. L. R. 
1253. 
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Surety on contractor's bond, and as-
signee of money to become due on con-
tract, right as between, 76 A. L. R. 917. 
Surety who completes contract, right to 
moneys earned by contractor but unpaid 
before default, 45 A. L. R. 379, 134 A. L. 
R. 738, 164 A. L. R. 613. 
Workmen's compensation insurance pre-
miums as within coverage of contractor's 
bond, 102 A. L. R. 135, 164 A. L. R. 1468. 
14-2-2. Failure to require bond-Direct liability.-Any person subject 
to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and 
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be per-
sonally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed 
labor under the contract for the reasonable value of such materials fur-
nished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices 
agreed upon. 
History: L. 1915, ch. 91, §§ 4, 5; C. L. 
1917, §§ 3762, 3763; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
17-2-2. 
1. In general. 
Cited or applied in Boise-Payette Lbr. 
Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 3 U. (2d) 
150, 280 P. 2d 448, 449; Backus v. Hooten, 
4 U. (2d) 364, 294 P. 2d 703, 704. 
2. Validity. 
This section is constitutional. Rio 
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 U. 114, 
167 P. 241, L. R. A. 1918A, 1193. 
3. Duty to exact bond. 
Where agreement between son who 
owned real property and his father re-
quired latter to construct dwelling upon 
land of son, and provided that father 
would pay cost and expenses of con-
structing house, it was held that it was 
duty of son to require his father to exe-
cute bond provided for by this section for 
protection of those who furnished ma-
terials for and performed labor on house, 
but in absence of securing such bond, he 
was liable for value of materials. Liberty 
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 U. 298, 
178 P. 341. 
4. Sufficiency of bond. 
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon 
contractor's faithful performance of con-
tract, and containing no express provision 
for payment of materialmen, was sufficient 
under this section to exonerate owner from 
liability, and to sustain right of material-
men to sue surety, in view of the fact that 
contract expressly required contractor to 
pay for all labor and materials. De Luxe 
Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 U. 144, 208 P. 2d 
1127. 
5. Unlicensed subcontractor. 
Fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed 
will not bar his right to sue on a bond 
or directly against the owner who fails to 
require a bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 U. 
(2d) 211, 299 P. 2d 837, 838. 
Collateral References. 
Mechanics' LiensP313. 
57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256. 
Bonds and insurance, 9 Am Jur. 56, 




CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
Chapter 1. Interest, 15-1-1 to 15-1-5, 15-1-7, 15-1-10 [15-1-6, 15-1-8, 15-1-9 
Repealed]. 
2. Legal Capacity of Children, 15-2-1 to 15-2-4. 
3. Interparty Agreements, 15-3-1 to 15-3-4. 







15-1-2a. Conditional sales of tangible personal property-Regulation of con-
tracts-Maximum rates, 
Calculated by the year. 






Usury-Taking excessive interest a misdemeanor. 
Repealed. 
Usury-Forfeiture of all interest-Triple damages for interest already 





15-1-10. Usury-Discounting negotiable paper. 
15-1-1. Legal rate.-The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbear-
ance of any money, goods or things in action shall be six per cent per 
annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way 
affect any penalty or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent 
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day 
of May, 1907. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C. L. 1907, 
§ 1241; C. L. 1917, § 3320; R. S. 1933, 44-
0-1; L. 1935, ch. 42,, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1935 amendment reduced the rate 
from eight per cent to six per cent, in-
serted "any penalty or interest charge 
which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to," and substituted "obli-
gations" for "obligation." 
Prior to February 14, 1868, there was no 
territorial statute on the subject of inter-
est in Utah. Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55, 58, 
reversed on another point in 15 Wall. (82 
U. S.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250. At that time it 
was enacted, "That it shall not be lawful 
to take more than 10 per cent interest per 
annum, when the amount of interest has 
not been specified or agreed upon." (Laws 
1868, ch. 13, p. 15.) But on February 19, 
1869, this act was repealed and the follow-
ing enacted, to wit: "That it shall be law-
ful to take ten per cent interest per an-
num, when the amount of interest has not 
been specified or agreed upon." (Laws 
1869, ch. 19, p. 17.) Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 
63, 65. The Act of 1869 became Comp. 
Laws 1876, § 380, and its provisions re-
mained unchanged. (Godbe v. Young, 1 
U. 55, reversed on another point in 15 
Wall. (82 U. S.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250) until 
it was repealed because of its negative 
character. Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63. 
Thus it will be seen that former rate 
was ten per cent per annum. Openshaw v. 
Utah & N. Ry. Co., 6 U. 268, 21 P. 999. 
Subsequently the legal rate was changed 
to eight per cent in the absence of agree-
ment, R. S. 1898, § 1241. This section was 
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repealed by Laws 1907, ch. 46, § 14, § 1 
of which established the rate also at eight 
per cent. This was left unchanged by 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 1241. 
Cross-Ref e,rences. 
Payment of interest as extending 
statute of limitations, 78-12-44. 
Regulation by special laws prohibited, 
Const. Art. VI, § 26. 
1. In general. 
Cited in Hansen v. Snell, 11 U. (2d) 64, 
354 P. 2d 1070. 
2. Pawnbrokers and mone,y lenders. 
So far as 7-8-3, industrial loans, conflicts 
with this section and chapter it must pre-
vail, for the former legislation is a special 
and subsequent act, and repeals "all laws 
in conflict" therewith. People's Finance & 
Thrift Co. v. Varney, 75 U. 355, 285 P. 304. 
3. Installments. 
Where a note provided for payment of 
interest in regular installments and maker 
defaulted, such maker was liable for in-
terest on sums in default at rate of eight 
per cent, as fixed by this section. Jens en 
v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036. 
(Prior to 1935 amendment.) 
4. Damages for breach of contract. 
Eight per cent interest is not allowable 
on damages recovered in action for breach 
of contract; only six per cent is allow-
able. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry v. 
Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 U. 
385, 140 P. 2d 344. 
5. Debts overdue. 
In Utah, interest is allowed on debts 
overdue, even in absence of statute or 
contract providing therefor. Wasatch Min. 
Co. v. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8, 16, 24 P. 
586, affd. 151 U.S. 317, 38 L. Ed. 177, 14 
S. Ct. 348. 
6. School districts. 
School district, where it has received 
benefit of goods, should pay legal rate 
of interest from date it received benefit 
of its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A. 
A. Clark Co., 53 U. 336, 178 P. 764. 
7. Extent of recovery by borrower. 
Where one loaning money had received 
full amount of money loaned and interest 
at rate of 15 per cent per annum, debt 
was fully paid, and lender could not re-
cover anything in addition. Carter v. 
West, 38 U. 381, 113 P. 1025. 
8. Determination of earning power of 
money. 
This rate cannot be used as a basis of 
arriving at the reasonable earning power 
of money; in estimating damages plaintiff 
is entitled to in action for personal in-
juries. Klinge v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 89 
U. 284, 286, 57 P. 2d 367, 105 A. L. R. 204. 
9. Eminent domain. 
A condemnee is entitled to interest at 
the rate of only six per cent from the 
date of an order of immediate occupancy 
to the date of judgment. State v. Daniel-
son, 122 U. 220, 247 P. 2d 900. 
Collateral Reforences. 
Interest<i>=>29. 
47 C.J.S. Interest § 32. 
Rate of interest, 30 Am. Jur. 25, Inter-
est § 31 et seq. 
Agreement to receive something other 
than money for loan, 95 A. L. R. 1231. 
Constitutionality, construction, and ap-
plication of statutes regarding rate of in-
terest during "emergency," 147 A. L. R. 
1023. 
Expenses or charges (including taxes) 
incident to loan of money, 63 A. L. R. 823. 
Finance charge in connection with con-
ditional sale contract as usury, 143 A. L. 
R. 238. 
Law of the forum as governing the right 
to and rate of interest as damages for de-
lay in payment of money or discharge of 
other obligations, 78 A. L. R. 1047. 
Rate of interest after maturity on con• 
tract naming rate but not employing term 
"until paid," or similar phrase, 75 A, L. R. 
399. 
Rate of interest after maturity on con• 
tracts fixing rate "until payment," 6 A. L. 
R. 1196. 
Rate of interest after maturity on obli-
gation which fixes rate of interest ex-
pressly until maturity, 16 A. L. R. 2d 902. 
Statutes in relation to interest as ob-
noxious to constitutional provision against 
impairing obligation of contracts, 87 A. 
L. R. 462. 
Validity and effect of anticipatory pro-
vision in con tract in relation to rate of 
interest in event of default, 12 A. L. R. 
367. 
15-1-2. Maximum rates.-The parties to any contract may agree in 
writing for the payment of interest for the loan or forbearance of any 




(a) That a loan or any renewal thereof except a loan made under 
subsection (g) may specifically provide for a service charge, which charge 
shall not exceed four per cent of the principal sum of said loan; such serv-
ice charge shall not be subject to any additional charge or interest; 
(b) That a loan may provide for reasonable collection costs and for a 
reasonable attorney's fee in the event of default or delinquency; 
(c) That on loans of money only, to the amount of $100 or less, it may 
be agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on such loan not to 
exceed $1 for the first month only of such loan, but thereafter no greater 
interest shall be contracted for, taken or received than is allowed in this 
section. This proviso shall not be construed to allow or permit the splitting 
up of transactions for the loan of money into small amounts for the pur-
pose of evading the provisions of this chapter: 
( d) That licensees under the Utah Small Loan Act may contract for 
and receive interest at the rates and subject to the limitations provided 
in chapter 10, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
( e) That credit unions may contract for and receive interest and 
charges at the rates and subject to the limits contained in chapter 9, Title 
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
(f), That industrial loan corporations may contract for and receive 
interest and charges at the rates subject to the limitations contained in 
chapter 8, Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
(g) That any corporation, except small loan licensees, operating under 
the supervision of the state banking department of Utah, and any national 
bank or federal savings and loan association doing business in the state 
may add to or deduct in advance from the proceeds of any loan repayable 
in installments over a period of not more than 63 months and not exceed-
ing $5,000.00 in principal amount, interest or discount at a rate not ex-
ceeding seven per cent per annum upon the principal amount of the loan 
for the entire period thereof; provided, however, such amount added on or 
discounted shall be computed in accordance with rate charts yielding the 
lender interest which shall not exceed 14% per annum. Provided further, 
the debtor may satisfy in full the indebtedness on any installment date 
before its final maturity and in so satisfying said indebtedness, shall re-
ceive a refund credit of unearned interest or discount computed in accord-
ance with such reasonable formula based upon recognized commercial 
practice as the state banking commissioner shall, by regulation prescribe; 
provided further, that where the amount of such refund credit would be 
less than $1, no refund need be made. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46. & 2; C. L. charges and payment of interest in ad-
1907, & 1241x: C. L. 1917. § 3321: R. S. 
1933, 44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, & 1; C. 1943, 
44-0-2; L. 1953, ch. 24, § 1; 1955, ch. 20, 
§ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1935 amendment reduced the rate 
specified in the first sentence from 12 per 
cent to 10 per cent and added two para-
graphs relating to handling or service 
vance. 
The 1953 amendment made substantial 
changes in the arrangement of this sec-
tion. 
The 1955 amendment made substantial 
chang-es in the wordin!! and arranqement 
of this section and added subds. (cl), (e), 
(f). and (g). 
The present section bears little simi-
larity to its predecessors, except that it 
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has always been provided that there may 
be a conventional rate. R. S. 1898, § 1241 
(now repealed); Comp. Laws 1907, § 1241x. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42: provided 
that said act should take effect June 15, 
1935. 
Cross-References. 
Credit unions, rate allowed, 7-9-16. 
Industrial loan corporations, rate al-
lowed, 7-8-3. 
Pawnbrokers, rate allowed, 11-6-2. 
Small loans, rate allo.wed on, 7-10-13. 
1. Construction, purpose and validity. 
The Usury Law does not operate retro-
spectively. Brunswick Realty Co. v. Uni-
versity Inv. Co., 43 U. 75, 134 P. 608. 
Usury laws are enacted primarily for the 
benefit of the borrower; the penalties are 
not primarily for purpose of punishing the 
lender. Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co., 
69 U. 41, 47, 252 P. 276. 
2. Determination of usuriousness. 
A contract, to be usurious, must be so 
when made, and it is essential that a cor-
rupt or unlawful intent to violate .the 
usury law, at least on the part of th,e 
lender, be proved to render a contract 
usurious. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 
109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522. 
3. Loan for less than one year. 
Under former section one per cent a 
month was precisely 12 per cent per an-
num, and this was especially so where the 
loan was for less than a whole year. Brown 
v. Johnson, 43 U. 1, 7, 134 P. 590, 46 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 1157, Ann. Cas. 19160, 321. 
4. Detention of money. 
This section includes regulations refa-
tive to the detention of money. The term 
"forbearance" includes detention. Mathis 
v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P. 
2d 518, 521. 
5. Interest afte,r maturity. 
Where the note provides for interest,, 
after maturity of the entire balance, at 
the highest lawful contract rate, and for 
15 per cent of the principal and interest 
of the note, or at the option of the holder, 
a reasonable sum, as attorney's fees, this 
provision does not violate the usury 
statute, for it provides for the highest 
lawful rate after. maturity of the entire 
obligation. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 
109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522. 
6. Usury law limited to transactions be-
tween parties. 
Utah code sections on usury apply to re-
latirmships between parties established .by 
their voluntary acts, and not to inte-rest 
imposed by statute. McFarlane v. Winters, 
114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494. 
7. Defense of usury as personal to mort-
gagor. 
In suit to foreclose corporate mort-
gage, stockholder of mortgagor cannot in-
terpose defense of usury predicated on 
gifts of stock to mortgagee by other stock-
holders which, if added to interest pro-
vided in mortgage, would make it usurious, 
since defense of usury is personal to mort-
gagor. Rospigliosi v. Glenallen Min. Co. 
(Grace et al., interveners), 69 U. 41, 252 
P. 276. 
8. Acceleration clause. 
By the great weight of authority, it is 
held that the inclusion, in a contract to 
repay money, of a provision that, on de-
fault in the payment of the interest, or an 
installment of the principal, the entire 
indebtedness, including interest for the 
whole term or interest to the date of de-
fault, shall become due, does not con-
stitute usury though the amount of such 
interest will exceed the legal rate. The ex-
cess interest, however, is penal, and can 
be neither collected nor retained. Mathis 
. v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P. 
2d 518, 522, quoting 84 A. L. R. 1283, and 
adopting rule in instant case. 
9. Recovery on usurious contract. 
In action against finance company to 
recover principal and interest on alleged 
usurious loan, demurrer to complaint 
should have been sustained in absence of 
allegation that contract was made in Utah 
or was subject to its laws. Farrer v. Atlas 
Acceptance Corp., 97 U. 261, 92 P. 2d 729. 
If it should appear that seller in a writ-
ten conditional sales contract ·intended to 
collect a sum as interest greater than al-
lowed by law, the contract would be 
usurious. Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 
109· U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522 following 
and highly commending Seebold v. Eust-
ermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N. W. 2d 739, 
152 A. L. R. 585. 
10. Validity of title of statute. 
T11e title to this statute is not obnoxious 
to constitutional requirements. Morgan 
Motor & Finance Co. v. Oliver, 101 U. 492, 
124 P. 2d 778. 
11. Exceptions. 
The rate of interest allowed industrial 
loan companies is an exception to the rates 
provided for under this section. Seaboard 
Finance Co. v. Wahlen, 123 U. 529, 260 P. 
2d 556, 557. 
12. Intent of lender. 
A corrupt or unlawful intent to violate 
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the usury law is a necessary element of 
usury and must be proved. The intent to 
constitute usury is the intent to exact 
payments which exceed the amount of in-
terest allowed by the statute-not the 
specific intent to violate the statute. 
Rossberg v. Holesapple, 123 U. 544, 260 P. 
2d 563, 566. (Dissenting opinions 123 U. 
544, 260 P. 2d 563, 569.) 
13. Sale of credit. 
A sale of credit, as distinguished from 
a loan of money, does not come within the 
purview of usury laws. However, the mere 
fact that the lender had to travel and use 
his credit to borrow the necessary money 
from a third party before he could make 
available the funds to the borrower does 
not make the transaction between the 
parties a sale or loan of credit instead 
of a loan of money. Rossberg v. Holes-
apple, 123 U. 544, 260 P. 2d 563, 566. (Dis-




47 C.J.S. Interest § 32. 
Rate of interest, 30 Am. Jur. 25, In-
terest § 31 et seq. 
Computation, as between vendor and 
vendee under land contract, of interest 
upon deferred payments, 25 A. L. R. 2d 
965. 
Computation of interest chargeable 
against executor or administrator for de-
lay in payment of legacies or distributive 
shares, 18 A. L. R. 2d 1432. 
Rate of interest after maturity on ob-
ligation which fixes rate of interest ex-
pressly until maturity, 16 A. L. R. 2d 
902. 
Retrospective application and effect of 
statutory provision for interest or changed 
rate of interest, 4 A. L. R. 2d 932. 
Law Reviews. 
Usury in California, by William Tris-
tam Coffin, 16 Calif. Law Review 281, 
387. 
Usury, by Raymond B. McConlogue, 1 
S. Calif. Law Review 253. 
15-1-2a. Conditional sales of tangible pe,rsonal property-Regulation o,f 
contracts-Maximum rates.-A.. Definitions. A.s used in this act, unless the 
context otherwise requires: 
(1) "Conditional sale contract" shall mean: 
(a) A.ny contract for the sale of any tangible personal property, with 
or without accessories, under which possession is delivered to the buyer 
but the title vests in the buyer thereafter only upon the payment of all 
or part of the price, or upon the performance of any other condition. 
(b) A.ny contract for the bailment or leasing of any tangible personal 
property, with or without accessories, by which the bailee or lessee agrees 
to pay as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to the value of the 
property, and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to 
become, or has the option of becoming the owner of the property upon 
full compliance with the terms of the contract. 
(c) A.ny contract for the sale of any tangible personal property, with 
or without accessories, under which possession is delivered to the buyer, 
and a lien on the property is to vest in the seller as security for the pay-
ment of part or all of the price, or for the performance of any other 
condition. 
(2) "Seller" shall mean the person who sells or leases the property 
under a conditional sale contract. 
(3) "Buyer" shall mean the person who buys or hires property under 
a conditional sale contract, or any legal successor in an interest of su.ch 
person. 
( 4) "Person" shall mean and include an individual, company, firm, 
association, partnership, trust, corporation, or other legal entity. 
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(5) "Cash price" shall mean the amount for which the seller would 
sell and transfer to the buyer unqualified title to the personal property 
described in the conditional sale contract, if such property were sold for 
cash at the seller's place of business on the date such contract is executed, 
and includes any applicable tax. 
(6) "Down payment" shall mean that part of the cash price which 
the buyer pays or agrees to pay to the seller in cash or property value 
or money's worth at or prior to delivery by the seller to the buyer of the 
personal property described in the conditional sale contract. 
(7) "Unpaid balance" shall mean the difference between (5) and (6) 
above, plus the cost of insurance and optional benefits, if any, and all 
fees paid or to be paid to any public officer, in connection with the trans-
action, which are included in the contract balance. 
(8) "Time price differential" shall mean the amount by which seller's 
total time price exceeds the aggregate of the cash sale price, the cost of 
insurance and optional benefits, if any, and any other permissible cost 
or expense incidental to the installment sale; and it shall be deemed a 
component part of the seller's total time price, and not interest for the 
forbearance, use or detention of money or credit even though given and 
set forth in the contract as a separate item, along with other items as in 
the next subsection required, it being in the interest of the public that 
the buyer be informed and apprised of all of the items aggregating the 
total time credit price at the time, or immediately after, the time credit 
price has been agreed to by the parties to the transaction. 
(9) "Contract balance" shall mean the amount unpaid under the con-
ditional sale contract, which the buyer agrees to pay in installments as 
provided therein. 
(10) "Personal property" shall mean any tangible personal property, 
specifically including any vehicle required to be registered under the Motor 
Vehicle Act, as amended, of this state. 
B. Requirements. (1) Every conditional .sale contract for the time 
sale of tangible personal property, with or without accessories, shall be 
in writing and shall contain all of the agreements between the buyer and 
the seller relating to the personal property described therein. It shall be 
signed by the buyer or his authorized representative and by the seller 
or its authorized representative, and when so executed an exact copy there-
of shall be delivered by the seller to the buyer at the time of its execution. 
It shall recite the following separate items as such, in the following order: 
(a) The cash price of the personal property described in the condi-
tional sale contract. 
(b) The amount of the buyer's down payment, and whether made in 
cash or represented by the net agreed value of described property traded 
in, or both, together with a statement of the respective amounts credited 
for cash and for such property. Failure of the seller to comply with the 
foregoing provision shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability of 
the conditional sale contract. 
( c) The amount unpaid on the cash price, which is the difference 
between items (a) and (b) above. 
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( d) The cost to the buyer of any insurance and optional benefits which 
is included in the contract balance, provided that where the buyer had 
insurance on personal property traded in, said buyer shall be entitled to 
have said insurance transferred to the new personal property or vehicle 
purchased under the act or to buy new insurance wherever he desires on 
said new personal property or vehicle. 
( e) A. description and itemization of amounts, if any, which will actu-
ally be paid by the seller or his assignee to any public officer as fees in 
connection with the transaction, which are included in the contract bal-
ance. 
(f) The amount of the unpaid balance, which is the sum of items ( c), 
(d) and (e). 
(g) The amount of the time price differential. 
(h) The contract balance owed by the buyer to the seller, which is 
the sum of items (f) and (g). 
(i) The number of installments required to pay the contract balance, 
the amount of each installment, and the date for payment of the install-
ments. 
(2) If any charge for insurance is included in the amount paid or 
to be paid by the buyer under any conditional sale contract for the sale 
of personal property, with or without accessories, an insurance policy or 
policies or a certificate of insurance under a master policy shall be issued 
and the seller shall within 30 days after the execution of the conditional 
sale contract send or cause to be sent to the buyer the original or an exact 
copy of such policy or policies or certificate. 
(3) The amount of the time price differential in any conditional sale 
contract for the sale of personal property, with or without accessories, 
shall not exceed a sum in excess of 1 per cent of the unpaid balance multi-
plied by the number of months, including any excess fraction thereof as 
one month, elapsing between the date of such contract and the due date 
of the last installment, or five dollars ($5) or in the case of motor vehicles 
fifteen dollars ($15), whichever is greater, provided that such contract 
may provide for interest on any delinquent installment from and after the 
date of delinquency, and for reasonable collection costs and fees in the 
event of delinquency. 
( 4) A.ny provision in any conditional sale contract for the sale of 
personal property to the contrary notwithstanding, the buyer may satisfy 
in full the indebtedness evidenced by such contract at any time before the 
final maturity thereof, and in so satisfying such indebtedness shall receive 
a refund credit thereon for such anticipation of payments. After first 
deducting from such time price differential a minimum charge of not to 
exceed five dollars ( $5) or in the case of motor vehicles [ fifteen dollars] 
($15), the amount of such refund shall represent at least 70% of that pro-
portion of the time price differential as the sum of the periodic time bal-
ances after the month in which such contract is paid in full bears to the 
sum of all the periodic time balances under the schedule of payments in 
the contract, both sums to be determined according to the monthly balances 
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which would result if the indebtedness were paid according to the terms 
of the contract; provided, however, that the provisions of this subsection 
shall not impair the right of the seller or his assignee to receive a minimum 
time price differential of five dollars ($5) or in the case of motor vehicles 
fifteen dollars ($15), or to receive interest on delinquent installments or 
reasonable collection costs and fees, as provided in subdivision (3) of this 
subsection; and provided further, that where the amount of such refund 
credit would be less than one dollar ( $1), no refund need be made. 
(5) If the seller, except as the result of an accidental or bona fide error 
in computation, shall violate any provision of subdivisions (3) or ( 4) of 
this subsection the conditional sale contract shall not be enforceable, except 
by a holder, other than seller, of such contract, and the buyer, after return 
of the property conditionally sold, may recover from the seller in a civil 
action the total amount paid on the contract balance by the buyer to the 
seller or his assignee pursuant to the terms of such contract. 
If the seller, except as the result of an accidental or bona fide error 
in computation, shall violate any other provision of this section, such failure 
shall in no way affect the validity or enforceability of the conditional sale 
contract. However, the buyer may recover from the seller in a civil action 
an amount equal to the time price differential as set forth in the contract. 
( 6) If the holder, other than seller, of such contract, except as the 
result of an accidental or bona fide error in computation, shall violate any 
provision of subdivision ( 4) of this subsection, the buyer, after return 
of the property conditionally sold, may recover from such holder in a 
civil action the total amount paid on the contract balance by the buyer 
to such holder pursuant to the terms of such contract. 
(7) The provisions of this act shall not apply to sales as defined herein 
in which the cash price is greater than $7,500.00, nor to the sale of personal 
property as a component part of a contract for the sale of real estate. 
History: C. 1953, 15-1-2a, enacted by 
L. 1953, ch. 24, § 2. 
Compiler's Note. 
The bracketed words "fifteen dollars" 
in subd. B(4) were inserted by the com-
piler. 
Title of Act. 
An act to amend section 15-1-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, relating to maxi-
mum rates; and enacting a new section to 
be known as section 15-l-2a, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; providing for the regu-
lation of contracts for the conditional sale 
of tangible personal property and provid-
ing for the maximum rates to be, charged 
in connection therewith and providing 
penalties for violations. 
Cross-References. 
Chattel mortgages title, conditional sales 
excepted, 9-1-15. 
Livestock, leases and sales of, 25-3-1 et 
seq. 
Railroad equipment, conditional sales of, 
56-1-23, 56-1-24. 
Uniform Sales Act, 60-1-1 et seq. 
1. In general. 
Cited in Seaboard Finance Co. v. Wah-
len, 123 U. 529, 260 P. 2d 556, 559. 
2. Interpretation of subdivision B(5). 
A conditional sales contract was enforce-
able by the seller, even though it was not 
signed by the seller, since the failure to 
meet this requirement does not affect the 
validity of the contract under subd. B(5). 
Dusenberry v. Taylor's, 7 U. (2d) 383, 325 
P. 2d 910. 
This provision seems almost absurd since 
a literal interpretation compels the conclu-
sion that a conditional sale contract au-
thorized by the statute is enforceable even 
though matters couched in mandatory 
language be omitted, but is une,nforceable 
if the seller made an accidental or bona 
fide error in computation. Dusenberry v. 





47 C.J.S. Interest § 32. 
Conditional sales, 47 Am. Jur. 6 et seq., 
Sales § 827 et seq. 
Buyer's rights, after repossession by 
conditional vendor, as to payments made, 
37 A. L. R. 100, 83 A. L. R. 965, 99 A. 
L. R. 1292, 49 A. L. R. 2d 15. 
Construction and effect of contract for 
sale of commodity or goods wherein quan-
tity is described as "about" or "more or 
less" than amount specified, 58 A. L. R. 2d 
377. 
What amounts to a conditional sale, 17 
A. L. R. 1421, 43 A. L. R. 1247, 92 A. L. 
R. 304, 175 A. L. R. 1366. 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year.-Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
written or verbal contract, or in any public or private instrument whatever, 
any certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is stated, 
interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by the year. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C. L. 1907, 
§ 1241x5; C. L. 1917, § 332.6; R. S. 1933 & 
c. 1943, 44-0-3. 
Collateral References. 
Intereste;,,4o. 
47 C.J.S. Interest § 42. 
Construction of contractual prov1s10ns 
as to interest as regards time from which 
interest is to be computed, 69 A. L. R. 
958. 
Time at which interest is payable under 
will or contract providing for payment of 
interest, 10 A. L. R. 997. 
Time from which interest begins to run 
on fidelity or public officer's bond, 57 A. 
L. R. 2d 1317. 
Time from which interest is chargeable 
against cotenant accountable for rents 
and profits or use and occupation, 51 A. 
L. R. 2d 398, 411. 
Time from which interest is recoverable 
on demand note or like demand instru-
ment containing no prnvision as to inter-
est, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1202. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.-Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by 
the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall 
bear interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C. L. 1907, 
§ 124lx9; C. L. 1917, § 3330; R. S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 44-0-4. 
Compiler's Note. 
Analogous former statute, see R. S. 
1898, § 1241. 
Cross-Reference,, 
Interest to be included in judgment en-
try, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e). 
1. Construction and operation generally. 
It is only to personal judgments that 
this section applies. Sidney Stevens Im-
plement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Bldg. 
& Improvement Co., 20 U. 267, 58 P. 843. 
This section provides that judgment, 
which is not upon obligation whe,re rate 
of interest is fixed, shall bear interest at 
rate of 8 per cent per annum. McFarlane 
v. Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494. 
Utah Code does not prevent inclusion 
of interest due as part of principal of 
judgment to be rendered. McFarlane v. 
Winters, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 2d 494, con-
struing this section. 
2. Allowance of inte,rest before judgment. 
The true test to be applied as to whether 
or not interest should be allowed, before 
judgment in given case, is not whether 
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, 
but whether injury and consequent dam-
ages are complete and must be ascertained 
as of particular time and in accordance 
with fixed rules of evidence. Fell v. Union 
Pac. Ry. Co., 32 U. 101, 88 P. 1003, 28 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1, 13 Ann. Cas. 1137. 
3. Interest on damages. 
Award of interest at legal rate on dam-
ages suffered by reason of breach of build-
ing contract from time they were suffered, 
held proper as against contention that 
since damages were unliquidated, no in-
terest could be allowed until after judg-
ment. Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. 
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist., 
61 U. 149, 211 P. 981. 
4. Estates of decedents. 
Where widower and executrix both 
claimed certain moneys on deposit in 
bank and stipulated that such money 
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should remain in bank at four per cent 
interest until outcome of litigation to 
determine rights to such money, executrix 
was not entitled to additional four per 
cent on judgment from time it was rend-
ered to time remittitur was filed after ap-
peal by widower. Evancovich v. Schiller, 
83 U. 1, 26 P. 2d 830. 
5. Amendment of judgment. 
Judgment revised to include interest at 
statutory rate where Supreme Court had 
inadvertently omitted it from its opinion. 
Keller v. Chournos, 95 U. 31, 79 P. 2d 86. 
6. Renewal of judgment. 
Computation in renewing, from time to 
time, judgment founded on tort for per-
sonal injury and property damage, so as 
to include total sum of previous judgment 
plus unpaid interest thereby giving inter-
est upon interest, was not erroneous under 
this section as compounding interest or as 
usurious, since usury sections of Code do 
not apply to interest imposed by statute. 
McFarlane v. Winte.rs, 114 U. 502, 201 P. 
2d 494. 
7. Eminent domain. 
Until the amount of damages sustained 
by a condemnee is determined, there is no 
judgment which will bear interest within 
the meaning of this section. State v. 
Danielson, 122 U. 220, 247 P. 2d 900. 
8. Reinstatement of judgment. 
Where plaintiff's judgment on jury ver-
dict was subsequently set aside by trial 
court and later reinstated on appeal, plain-
tiff is entitled to interest from the date of 
entry of judgment on verdict and not from 
the date of Inter reinstatement. Hewitt v. 
General Tire & Rubber Co., 5 U. (2d) 379, 
302 P. 2d 712. 
9. Interest during pendency of appeal. 
Where no tender of payment was made, 
interest accrued on a money judgment of a 
federal court during the pendency on an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals and effort 
to obtain further review by the Supreme 
Court. ·woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 290 F. 
2d 186. 
10. Interest on judgment in federal court. 
When the jurisdiction of a United States 
court is based upon diverse citizenship and 
interest is not specifically fixed in some 
other and binding manner, the law of the 
state controls the allowance of interest. 
Woodmont, Inc. v. Daniels, 290 F. :ld 186. 
Collateral References. 
Interest<e:=38 (1). 
47 C.J.S. Interest § 40. 
Interest on judgments and decrees, 30 
Am. Jur. 39, Interest § 49. 
Date of verdict or date of entry of 
judgment thereon as beginning of interest 
period on judgment, 1 A. L. R. 2d 479. 
Interest on decree or judgment of pro-
bate court allowing a claim against es-
tate or making an allowance fol' se!'vices, 
54 A. L. R. 2d 814. 
Intel'est on judgment awarding inter-
pleaded or impleaded disputed funds, 15 
A. L. R. 2d 483. 
Right to interest on unpaid alimony, 
33 A. L. R. 2d 1455. 
15-1-5. Usury-Taking excessive interest a misdemeanor.-No person 
shall, directly or indirectly, take or receive in services, money or other 
property, any greater sum or greater value for the loan or forbearance of 
any money, goods or things in action than is prescribed in section 15-1-2. 
A.ny person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 3; C. L. 1907, 
§ 1241xl; L. 1909, ch. 81, § 1; C. L. 1917, 
§ 3322; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-5. 
Compiler's Note. 
The reference in this section to "section 
15-1-2" appeared in Code 1943 as "section 
44-0-2." 
1. Waiver. 
The usury statute was made for benefit 
of borrower and he may waive its pro-
visions. Conner v. Smith, 51 U. 129, 169 P. 
158. 
2. Criminal prosecutions. 
In order to convict under this section 
upon a criminal charge, no doubt proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt would he re-
quil'ecl. Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 
187, 152 P. 424. 
Collateral References. 
U surye=:,149 (1). 
91 C.J.S. Usuary § 160. 
Generally, 55 Am. Jur. 323, Usury § I 
et seq. 
Practice of exacting usury as nuisance 






This section (L. 1907, ch. 46, § 5; C. L. 
1907, § 1241x3; C. L. 1917, § 3324; R. S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6), relating to the 
voiding of usurious contracts and securi-
ties, was repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 21, 
§ 2. 
15-1-7. Usury-Forfeiture of all interest-Triple damages for interest 
already paid-Limitation of action.-The taking, receiving, reserving, or 
charging of a rate of interest greater than is allowed by section 15-1-2, 
shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or 
other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid 
thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid the person 
by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back 
three times the amount of the interest thus paid from the receiver or taker 
thereof and reasonable attorney fees, provided that such action is com-
menced within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 4; C. L. 1907, 
§ 1241x2; C. L. 1917, § 3323; R. S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 44-0-7; L. 1955, ch. 21, § 1. 
Compiler's Note. 
Prior to the 1955 amendment this sec-
tion read: "Every person, or in the event 
of his death his personal representative, 
who shall pay or deliver any greater sum 
or value than is allowed by this chapter 
to be received for or on any loan or 
forbearance, or who shall pay the prin-
cipal or any part thereof of a usurious 
loan or forbearance, may recover from the 
person who shall have taken or received 
the same the amount of money so paid 
or value delivered, both of. principal and 
interest, provided action is brought within 
one year after such payment or delivery. 
If such action is not brought within said 
one year and prosecuted with diligence, 
then the superintendent of public instruc-
tion may sue for and recover such sums, 
with costs, at any time within three years 
after said one year, for the use and bene-
fit of the state district school fund, and 
the sum so collected shall be forthwith paid 
into said fund." 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 2 of Laws 1955, ch. 21, pro-
vided as follows: "Sections 15-1-6, 15-1-8 
and 15-1-9 Utah Code Annotated 1953, are 
hereby repealed." 
Savings Clause. 
Section 3 of Laws 1955, ch. 21, pro-
vided as follows: "Nothing herein shall 
affect any action filed before the effective 
date of this act." 
1. Validity. 
The title of the original act is suffi-
ciently broad to cover this section. Cobb 
v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424. 
2. Application in general. 
The provisions of this section are suf-
ficiently broad to include a usurious con-
ditional sales contract, as well as other 
usurious contracts. Morgan Motor & Fi-
nance Co. v. Oliver, 101 U. 492, 124 P. 2d 
778, followed and approved in Mathis v. 
Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P. 
2d 518. 
This section prohibits taking of interest 
on finance charge. Mathis v. Holland 
Furnace Co., 109 U. 449, 166 P. 2d 518, 520. 
3. Recovery of principal and interest. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this sec-
tion provides for suit by the borrower or 
his "personal representatives," a surviving 
partner may maintain the action under the 
authority of 75-11-9. Cobb v. Hartenstein, 
47 U. 174, 152 P. 424, cited with approval 
in Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 U. 
449, 166 P. 2d 518, 522. 
In action against finance company to 
recover principal and interest on alleged 
usurious loan, demurrer to complaint 
should have been sustained in absence of 
allegation that contract was made in Utah 
or was subject to its laws. Farrer v. 
Atlas Acceptance Corp., 97 U. 261, 92 P. 
2d 729. 
4. - limitations. 
A person who has paid money or has 
delivered "things in action" in excess of 
the rate fixed by the preceding section 
may sue for and recover back both "prin-
cipal and interest," if the action is brought 
within the time prescribed by this section. 
Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424. 
Action by borrower of money on usuri-
ous contract to recover pledged property 
was not governed by limitation provision 
of this section but by Code 1943, 104-2-24. 
Conner v. Smith, 51 U. 129, 169 P. 158. 
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For present law, see Judicial Code, 78-
12-26. 
5. - evidence. 
Burden of proof is on him who alleges 
usury to establish it by at least clear and 
convincing evidence, and not merely by a 
preponderance thereof. Brown v. Johnson, 
43 U. 1, 13, 134 P. 590, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
1157, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 321. 
In a proceeding under this section to 
recover back payments of usury, plaintiff 
need not establish the case by proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt; the evidence, 
however, must be strong, clear and con-
vincing. Cobb v. Hartenstein, 47 U. 174, 
152 P. 424. 
Collateral References. 
Usury-Pl 09. 
91 C.J.S. Usury § 142 et seq. 
Recovery of payment, 55 Am. Jur. 401, 
Usury § 111 et seq. 
Acceptance of secret compensation by 
bank officer or employee in making loan 
by bank as charging bank with usury, 52 
A. L. R. 2d 703. 
Agreement releasing cause of action or 
defense based on exaction of usury, valid-
ity, construction and effect, 99 A. L. R. 
600. 
Assignment of pa1·t of amount due or 
to fall due upon money obligation as sale 
or loan for purposes of Usury Law, 165 
A. L. R. 626. 
Availability of setoff, counterclaim, or 
the like to recover either penalty for 
usury in, or usurious interest paid on, 
separate transaction or instrument, 54 
A. L. R. 2d 1344. 
Borrower's fraud contributing to execu-
tion of usurious contract as affecting 
rights or remedies of parties, 63 A. L. R. 
962. 
Computing interest on basis of 360 days 
in year, 30 days in month, or the like, 
as usury, 35 A. L. R. 2d 842., 
Delay in paying over proceeds of loan to 
borrower as affecting question of usury, 76 
A. L. R. 1467. 
Effect on indebtedness originally valid 
of usurious forbearance, renewal, or ex-
tension, 3 A. L. R. 877. 
Expenses or charges in form of commis-
sions to agents, brokers, or like intermedi-
aries incident to loan of money, 52 A. L. 
R. 2d 703. 
Fixed interest charge for uncertain term 
as usury, 3 A. L. R. 1385. 
Leaving part of loan on deposit with 
lender as usury, 12 A. L. R. 1422. 
Negotiable Instruments Law as affecting 
defense of usury, 95 A. L. R. 735. 
Obligations covering deferred payments 
of purchase money or extension thereof 
as loan or forbearance within Usury Law, 
91 A. L. R. 1105. 
Parol-evidence rule as affecting extrinsic 
evidence to show or to negative usury, 82 
A. L. R. 1199, 104 A. L. R. 1261. 
Payment or offer to pay principal and 
legal interest as condition of relief, in 
equity, against usurious contract, 70 A. 
L. R. 693, 135 A. L. R. 808, 166 A. L. R. 
458. 
Periodic advance interest payments dur-
ing time of loan as usury, 57 A. L. R. 2d 
656. 
Provision for interest after maturity at 
a rate in excess of legal rate as usurious, 
82 A. L. R. 1213. 
Recovery of cumulative statutory penal-
ties for usury transactions, 71 A. L. R. 2d 
1011. 
Release of borrower prior to maturity 
of loan, as affecting usury, by taking or 
charging interest in advance, 57 A. L. R. 
2d 674. 
Requiring borrower to pay insurance 
premium on property mortgaged as secur-
ity as usury, 53 A. L. R. 761. 
Right of a purchaser assuming a mort-
gage debt, with the authorization of the 
mortgagor, to set up usury in mortgage as 
a defense or rely upon it as a ground of 
relief in equity, 82 A. L. R. 1153. 
Right of guarantor or surety for cor-
poration to set up usury where corporation 
could not, 63 A. L. R. 2d 924. 
Right of junior mortgagee to attack sen-
ior mortgage for usury, 59 A. L. R. 342, 
121 A. L. R. 879. 
Right of surety or guarantor to avail 
himself of defense of usury, 70 A. L. R. 
359. 
Right to have usurious payments made 
on previous obligation applied as payment 
of principal on renewal, 13 A. L. R. 1244. 
Taking or charging interest in advance 
as usury, 57 A. L. R. 2d 630. 
Transaction in form a sale, but accom-
panied by an agreement or option for re-
purchase by the vendor or a third person 
previously interested, as a loan as regards 
Usury Law, 154 A. L. R. 1063. 
Usurious loan agreement as affecting 
collateral transaction or instrument not 
otherwise usurious, 75 A. L. R. 1344. 
Usurious nature of provision in promis-
sory note as evidence of indebtedness for 
payment, as attorneys' fees, expenses, and 
costs of collection, of specified percentage 
of note, 17 A. L. R. 2d 295, 316. 
Usury as affecting conditional sale con-
tract, 152 A. L. R. 598. 
Usury as effected by delay in delivering 
principal to borrower, 57 A. L. R. 2d 663. 
Validity of agreement to pay interest 
on interest, 76 A. L. R. 1484. 
Waiver of usury by renewal or other 
executory agreement, 74 A. L. R. 1184. 
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15-1-8, 15-1-9. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
These sections (L. 1907, ch. 46, §§ 6, 10; 
C. L. 1907, §§ 124lx4, 124lx8; C. L. 1917, 
§§ 3325, 3329; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-8, 
44-0-9), relating to usurious loans, were 
repealed by Laws 1955, ch. 21, § 2. 
15-1-10. Usury-Discounting negotiable paper.-The discount, sale and 
transfer, in the regular course of business, of negotiable paper by one not 
the maker thereof, without intent to violate this chapter, shall not be con-
strued as usurious. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 12; C. L. 1907, 2. Usurious contracts. 
§ 1241x10; C. L. 1917, § 3331; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 44-0-10. 
Compiler's Note. 
The reference in this section to "this 
chapter" appeared in Code 1943 as "this 
title." 
Cross-References. 
Negotiable instruments, Title 44. 
Promise to pay a sum certain may in-
include interest, 44-1-2. 
1. Bona fide purchaser of note. 
One purchasing note for valuable con-
sideration without notice of any of its 
infirmities, and without intent to evade 
provisions of statute relating to usury, was 
entitled to enforce collection of note. 
Rosenblum v. Gomoll, 52 U. 206, 173 P. 
243. 
The general rules governing usurious 
contracts are stated in Cobb v. Harten-
stein, 47 U. 174, 152 P. 424. 
Collateral References. 
Usurye::>26. 
91 C.J.S. Usury § 14. 
Usury as predicable upon transaction in 
form a sale or exchange of commercial 
paper or other choses in action, 165 A. L. 
R. 626. 
Law Review. 
Evasions Through Exactions Other Than 
Interest-Discounted Interest as Usury, by 
Anthony L. Styskal, 18 S. Calif. Law Re-
view 274. 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN 
Section 15-2-1. Period of minority. 
15-2-2. Liability for necessaries and on contracts-Disaffirmance. 
15-2-3. Limitation on right to disaffirm. 
15-2-4. Payment for personal services. 
15-2-1. Period of minority.-The period of minority extends in males 
to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years; 
but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1541; 
C. L. 1917, § 3955; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
14-1-1. 
Cross-References. 
Actions by or against, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 17 (b) ( c). 
Earnings of minor child of debtor ex-
empt from execution, 78-23-1, par. (12). 
Employment of minors, 34-4-1 et seq., 
34-5-1 et seq. 
Guardians ad litem, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 17 (b) ( c). 
Limitations, effect of disability on run-
ning of statute, 78-12-20, 78-12-21, 78-12-
36, 78-12-42, 78-12-43. 
Marriageable age, 30-1-2, 30-1-17. 
Parent or guardian, when may sue, 78-
11-5. 
Service of process on minor, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e) (2). 
Workmen's compensation, injured minors 
deemed sui juris, 35-1-89. 
Workmen's compensation, minor children 
as beneficiaries, 35-1-73. 
1. Age of majority. 
The age of majority for females in this 
state is 18. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 80 
U. 9, 13, 12 P. 2d 364. 
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2. Prosecution for carnal knowledge. 
In prosecution for carnal knowledge of 
female over age of 13 years and under 
age of 18 years, fact that female had 
attained her majority through marriage· 
was not a defense to the charge. State v. 
Huntsman, 115 U. 283, 204 P. 2d 448. 
3. Driver's license-Parent's liability. 
The words "such minor" as used through-
out section 41-2-10 concerning liability of 
persons signing application for driver's 
license for minor refers to persons under 
age of 18 years, and not to "minors" as 
term is defined in this section. Rogers v. 
Wagstaff, 120 U. 136, 232 P. 2d 766, 26 
A. L. R. 2d 1316. 
Where father signed application for 
driver's license for daughter, 16 years old, 
and within a year was divorced from his 
wife with custody of the daughter being 
given to his wife, and a mouth after the 
divorce the daughter was married, statu-
tory liability imposed on father by 41-2-10 
for injuries resulting from negligent driv-
ing of daughter was not affected by 
daughter's marriage or by the change in 
her custody, notwithstanding statute con-
ferring majority upon marriage. Rogers 
v. Wagstaff, 120 U. 136, 232 P. 2d 766, 
26 A. L. R. 2d 1316. 
Collateral References. 
In fan tse=c, 10. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 29. 
Period of infancy, 27 Am. Jur. 747, In-
fants § 3 et seq. 
Applicability of criminal statutes re-
lating to offenses against children of a 
specified age with respect to a child who 
has passed the anniversary date of such 
age, 73 A. L. R. 2d 874. 
Emancipation by parent as affecting 
right of infant to change domicile or set-
tlement, 5 A. L. R. 949. 
Inclusion or exclusion of day of birth in 
determining of attainment of majority, 5 
A. L. R. 2d 1147. 
Minor as subject to constructive or 
substituted service of process under stat-
utes providing for such service on non-
resident motorists, 53 A. L. R. 2d 1193 .. 
Power of infant, on death of both par-
ents, to change domicile, 32 A. L. R. 2d 
868. 
Right of child to sue parent or person in 
loco parentis for personal tort, 19 A. L. 
R. 2d 423. 
Right of one in loco parentis other than 
teacher to punish child, 43 A. L. R. 507. 
Right to appellate review of consent 
judgment involving infant, 69 A. L. R. 2d 
791. 
Statutory change of age of majority as 
affecting pre-existing rights, 170 A. L. R. 
222. 
Tort liability of child of tender years, 
67 A. L. R. 2d 570. 
15-2-2. Liability for necessaries and on contracts--Disafflrmance.-A 
minor is bound not only for reasonable value of necessaries but also by 
his contracts, unless he disaffirms them before or within a reasonable time 
after he attains his majority and restores to the other party all money 
or property received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining 
within his control at any time after attaining his majority. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1542; 1. Contracts contemplated by section. 
C. L. 1917, § 3956; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, This section was meant to apply to only 




infant, and probably was not intended to 
apply to contracts where infant was not 
minors may make and the principal therein, but, for example, 
Credit unions, shares may be issued to 
minors, 7-9-15. 
Earnings of minor child of debtor ex-
empt from execution, 78-23-1, par. (12). 
Limitations, effect of disability on run-
ning of statute, 78-12-20, 78-12-21, 78-12-
36, 78-12-42, 78-12-43. 
Negotiable instruments, effect of en-
dorsement or assignment by minor, 44-1-23. 
Sales Act, liability of minor for neces-
saries under, 60-1-2. 
Stock Transfer Act not to enlarge pow-
ers of minors, 16-3-2. 
was me1·ely a surety. Groesbeck v. Bell, 1 
U. 338. 
It is not unlawful to sell an automobile 
to a minor. Wilcox v. Wunderlich, 73 U. 
1, 19, 272 P. 207, applying Comp. Laws 
1917, § 3956. 
2. Disaffirmance of contract-Time of. 
What constitutes "reasonable time" 
under this section is a question of fact 
for the jury. Groesbeck v. Bell, 1 U. 338. 
In action on note against minor who had 
signed as cosigner, where disaffirmance in 
answe1· was filed by guardian ad !item four 
months after minor attained majority and 
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in amended answer by minor six months 
after attaining majority, disaffirmance was 
made within reasonable time. Merchants' 
Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 
364, 230 P. 1017. 
No hard and fast rule can be stated 
regarding precise time within which minor 
may disaffirm his contract and much de-
pends upon intelligence of minor, his 
means of knowledge, nature of and his re-
lation to the transaction, and purpose to be 
attained thereby. Merchants' Credit 
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 364, 230 
P. 1017. 
3. - form or manner of disaffirmance. 
Since no particular form of disaffirmance 
is necessary, attorney, acting as guardian 
ad !item in action against minor on note 
could disaffirm in answer. Merchants' 
Credit Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 
364, 230 P. 1017. 
4. - return of property or consideration. 
On disaffirmance of contract, all infant 
is required to restore is money or property 
received by him under contract remaining 
within his control at any time after attain-
ing his majority, but minor may not retain 
property indefinitely, and he must elect to 
disaffirm and comply with statutory provi-
sion within reasonable time after attaining 
his majority. Blake v. Harding, 54 U. 158, 
180 P. 172. 
It is not the law that infant may not 
disaffirm and recover if property he has 
received has become worthless, since to so 
hold is to impose duty upon infant to 
place other party to contract in exact 
statu quo, and adult, in dealing with 
minor, assumes all risk of loss. Blake v. 
Harding, 54 U. 158, 180 P. 172. 
Plaintiff, an infant, had right to dis-
affirm sale or exchange of property, and 
hence value of property he received and 
offered to return to defendant was neces-
sarily immaterial. Blake v. Harding, 54 
U. 158, 180 P. 172. 
Where minor has not received property 
or has squandered it during his minority, 
he is not required to restore it in order to 
effectuate disaffirmance. Merchants' Credit 
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama, 64 U. 364, 230 
P. 1017. 
Collateral References. 
Infants<t:=>58 ( 2). 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 75. 
Agreements for necessaries, 27 Am. Jur. 
758, Infants § 16 et seq. 
Absence from, or inability to attend, 
school or college as affecting liability for, 
or right to recover back payments on 
account of tuition or board, 69 A. L. R. 
714. 
Automobile or motorcycle as a necessary 
for infant, 78 A. L. R. 392. 
Capacity of minor insured to effect a 
change of beneficiary, 14 A. L. R. 2d 375. 
Civil liability of father for necessaries 
furnished to child taken from home by 
mother, 32 A. L. R. 1466. 
Failure to disaffirm as ratification of in-
fant's executory contract, 5 A. L. R. 2d 7. 
Infant's liability in tort for own act, or 
right to recover for another's tort, as 
affected by its connection with infant's 
contract, 127 A. L. R. 1441. 
Liability of infant for medical, dental, 
or hospital services to him, 71 A. L. R. 226. 
Liability of infant for necessaries where 
he lives with his parents, 70 A. L. R. 572. 
Liability of infant or his estate for rent, 
68 A. L. R. 1185. 
Liability of parent for dental services to 
minor child, 7 A. L. R. 1070. 
Measure of infant's recovery for value 
of chattel traded for another upon his 
rescission of the transaction, 52 A. L. R. 
2d 1114. 
Right of infant to disaffirm his sale of 
personalty and recover it from third per-
son purchasing without notice of infancy, 
16 A. L. R. 2d 1420. 
Right of infant to repudiate contract for 
services to recover thereon or in quantum 
meruit, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1302. 
Right to recover for money loaned to 
infant to purchase necessaries, 65 A. L. R. 
1337. 
Rights in respect of engagement and 
courtship presents to infant donee when 
marriage does not ensue, 24 A. L. R. 2d 
599. 
Validity, construction, and effect of stat-
ute making contract approved by court 
binding on infant, 3 A. L. R. 2d 702. 
Law Reviews. 
Statutory Problems in the Law of Min-
or's Contracts, 48 Columbia Law Review 
272. 
Liability of the Infant in Contract, 20 
Iowa Law Review 785. 
Is a College Education a Legal Neces-
sityi L. B. Howard, 34 Ohio Bar 295. 
Avoidance by Infants of Contracts for 
Performance of Services, 21 Rocky Moun-
tain Law Review 213, case note, Warner 
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Brode!, 31 Cal. 2d 
766, 192 P. 2d 949. 
The Status of Infancy as a Defense to 
Contracts, 34 Virginia Law Review 829. 
15-2-3. Limitation on right to disaffirm.,-N o contract can be thus dis-
affirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations 
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as to his majority or from his having engaged in business as adult, the other 
party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1543; ing without notice of infancy, 16 A. L. R. 




43 C.J.S. Infants § 27. 
Avoidance of infants' contracts, 27 Am. 
Jur. 771, Infants § 33 et seq. 
Right of infant to disaffirm his sale of 
personalty as against third person purchas-
Law Reviews. 
Limitation on Minors' Common Law 
Power to Disaffirm Contract, 16 Chicago 
Law Review 183, case note, Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Inc. v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 
192 P. 2d 949. 
Infants' Contracts and Their Enforce-
ment, 35 Washington Law Review 465. 
15-2-4. Payment for personal services.-When a contract for the per-
sonal services of a minor has been made with him alone, and those serv-
ices are afterward performed, payment made therefor to such minor in 
accordance with the terms of the contract is a full satisfaction for those 
services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover therefor a second time. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 1544; long to parent, and minor could recover 
C. L. 1907, § 3958; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, for injuries suffered while employed, where 
14-1-4. minor supported himself from his own 
1. Operation and effect of section. 
Although this section protects the em-
ployer against claims of the parent, if he 
pays the wages to the minor, "in the ab-
sence of statute to the contrary, a minor 
cannot in his own name and right maintain 
an action on such contract. In short, gen-
erally speaking, a minor is not sui juris." 
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 
108 U. 1, 156 P. 2d 885, 889. 
2. Earnings of minor. 
Earnings of minor do not absolutely be-
earnings and parents made no claim. Kuch-
enmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 
52 U. 116, 172 P. 725. 
Collateral References. 
InfantsP49. 
43 C.J.S. Infants § 85. 
Services of infants, 27 
Infants § 30. 
Am. Jur. 770, 
Liability for services of child taken into 
home without express agreement for com· 
pensation, 7 A. L. R. 2d 8. 
CHAPTER 3 
INTERPARTY AGREEMENTS 
Section 15-3-1. Conveyances, releases, sales by persons acting jointly. 
15-3-2. Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and obligee. 
15-3-3. Fraudulent transactions not validated. 
15-3-4. · Effective date of chapter. 
15-3-1. Conveyances, releases, sales by persons acting jointly.-A. con-
veyance, release or sale may be made to or by two or more persons acting 
jointly and one or more, but less than all, of these persons acting either 
by himself or themselves or with other persons; and a contract may be 
made between such parties. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 74, § 1; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 45-0-1. 
Comparable Provisions. 
States that have adopted the Model In-
terparty Agreement Act are as follows: 
Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania and 
Utah. 
Cross-References. 
Grant to two or more as creating ten-
ancy in common, 57-1-5. 
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Tenants in common or joint tenants as 
parties to actions, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 20(a). 
Decisions from other Jurisdictions-Penn-
sylvania. 
The words "other persons," in this stat-
ute, should be interpreted to include the 
husband or wife of a grantor in a deed of 
conveyance. In re Vandergrift's Estate, 
105 Pa. Sup. Ct. 293, 161 A. 898. 
One of the manifest purposes of this 
statute is to enable one person to make a 
conveyance of his land to another person 
jointly with himself and in that manner 
to divest himself of his entire estate there-
in. In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. 
Sup. Ct. 293, 161 A. 898. 
In a case where it was determined that 
deed of husband to wife created a tenancy 
in common and not a tenancy by the en-
tireties, this act was held to have had no 
application. In re Walker's Estate, 340 
Pa. 13, 16 A. 2d 28. 
Collateral References. 
Contracts<§:::;;>13. 
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 26. 
15-3-2. Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and obligee.-No 
contract shall be discharged because after its formation the obligation and 
the right thereunder become vested in the same person, acting in different 
capacities as to the right and the obligation. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 74, § 2; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 45-0-2. 
15-3-3. Fraudulent transactions not validated.-N othing herein shall 
validate a transaction within its provisions which is actually or construc-
tively fraudulent. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 74, § 3; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 45-0-3. 
15-3-4. Effective date of chapter.-This chapter shall not apply to con-
veyances, releases, sales or contracts made prior to July 1, 1929. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 74, § 4; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 45-0-4. 
CHAPTER 4 
JOINT OBLIGATIONS 
Section 15-4-1. Defini.tions. 
15-4-2. Discharge of co-obligors by judgment. 
15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor. 
15-4-4. Release of co-obligor-Reservation of rights. 
15-4-5. Release of co-obligor-Effect of knowledge of obligee. 
15-4-6. Death of joint obligor-Survivorship. 
15-4-7. Effective date of chapter. 
15-4-1. Definitions.-In this chapter, unless otherwise expressly stated, 
"obligation" includes a liability in tort; "obligor" includes a person liable 
for a tort; "obligee" includes a person having a right based on a tort; 
"several obligors" means obligors severally bound for the same perform-
ance. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 1; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 47-0-1. 
Compiler's Note. 
The reference in this section to "this 
chapter" appeared in the Revised Statutes 
of 1933 as "this title." 
Comparable Provisions. 
States that have adopted the Model 
Joint Obligations Act are as follows: Ha-
waii, Nevada, New York and Wisconsin. 
Cross-References. 
Appearance by single obligor, service on 
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remainder, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
4(b). 
Assignments for benefit of creditors, 
preferences by joint obligors, 6-1-20. 
Contribution between joint debtors, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(h). 
Execution of judgments against joint 
obligors, Rules of .Civil Procedure, Rule 69. 
Joinder of joint obligors, Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 20(a). 
Service of process on joint obligors, fail-
ure to serve all, effect, Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 71B(b). 
1. In general. 
Cited in United States v. First Security 
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d 
951. 
2. Purpose of statutes. 
Statutory provisions for the release of 
co-obligors are meant to relieve a co-
obligor whei·e, and to the extent, his 
o bligee has released another co-o bligor to 
his detriment. Plateau Uranium Invest-
ment Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 
326 P. 2d 1022. 
3. Release of joint tort-feasor or joint 
obligor. 
In personal injury action, where plaintiff 
accepted a substantial sum from defendant 
in consideration of promise not to sue de-
fendant for injuries sustained in accident, 
and thereafter dismissed his suit against 
defendant, trial court properly deducted 
such sum from judgment rendered against 
remaining codefendants. Green v. Lang 
Co., Inc., 115 U. 128, 206 P. 2d 626. 
Collateral References. 
Contracts~l83. 
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 352. 
Joint and several tort-feasors, 52 Am. 
Jur. 448, Torts § 110 et seq. 
Joint contracts, 12 Am. Jur. 814, Con-
tracts § 268 et seq. 
Conflict of laws regarding contribution 
between tort-feasors, 148 A. L. R. 1130. 
Grant of new trial, or reversal of judg-
ment on appeal as to one joint tort-feasor, 
as requiring new trial or reversal as to 
other tort-feasor, 143 A. L. R. 7. 
Judgment for plaintiff in action in tort 
or contract against codefendants, as con-
clusive in subsequent action between code-
fendants as to the liability of both or the 
liability of one and the nonliability of the 
other, 142 A. L. R. 727. 
Release of ( or covenant not to sue) one 
tol't-feasor as affecting liability of others, 
148 A. L. R. 1270. 
Right of defendant in tort action to 
have another joint tort-feasor brought in 
for purposes of enforcing contribution or 
indemnity or for showing liability of the 
latter to the plaintiff, as affected by fact 
that plaintiff's right of action against the 
person sought to be brought in was barred 
by lapse of time, 149 A. L. R. 1186. 
Right of tor t-f ea so r to contribution 
where judgment creditor is spouse, parent, 
child, etc., of other tort-feasor against 
whom contribution is sought, 19 A. L. R. 
2d 1003. 
15-4-2. Discharge of co-obligors by judgment.-A judgment against one 
or more of several obligors, or against one or more of joint or of joint 
or several obligors, shall not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party 
to the proceeding wherein the judgment was rendered. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 2; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 47-0-2. 
1. In general. 
Cited in United States v. First Security 
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d 
951. 
2. Release of claim. 
In an action to recover attorney's fees 
and costs for services rendered in effecting 
an incorporation where both the corpora-
tion and incorporators were obligated to 
attorney for different amounts, the obliga-
tion of the incorporators could be released 
only if the corporation paid the full 
amount of attorney's reduced claim against 
the corporation and could not be released 
merely by attorney's taking judgment for 
the amount of his reduced claim. Plateau 
Uranium Investment Corp. v. Sugar & 
Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326 P. 2d 1022. 
3. Joint tort-feasors. 
A judgment in favor of one joint tort-
feasor is no bar to an action against an-
other tort-feasor. Bergeson v. Life Ins. 
Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150. 
Collateral References. 
J udgmen t~632. 
50 C.J.S. Judgment § 756. 
Amount of recovery in tort action 
against servant or other person who was 
the active tort-feasor as limit of amount 
recoverable against one responsible only 
derivatively, 141 A. L. R. 1168. 
Creditor's reservation of rights against 
surety in releasing or extending time to 
principal debtor, 139 A. L. R. 85. 
384 
JOINT OBLIGATIONS 15-4-4 
Right of tort-feasor to contribution 
where judgment creditor is spouse, parent, 
child, etc., of other tort-feasor against 
whom contribution is sought, 19 A. L. R. 
2d 1003. 
15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor.-The amount or value of any considera-
tion received by the obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from 
one or more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in partial 
satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the extent of the 
amount received on the obligation of all co-obligors to whom the obligor 
or obligors giving the consideration did not stand in the relation of a 
surety. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 3; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 47-0-3. 
1. In general. 
Cited in United States v. First Security 
Bank, 208 F. 2d 424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d 
951; Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Uni-
versal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 4 U. (2d) 
155, 289 P. 2d 1045, 1049. 
2. Construction in general. 
This section presupposes that there are 
rights which can be reserved. Dawson v. 
Board of Education of Weber County 
School Dist., 118 U. 452, 222 P. 2d 590. 
3. Release of joint obligor. 
In personal injury action, where plain-
tiff accepted a substantial sum from de-
fendant in consideration of promise not 
to sue defendant for injuries sustained in 
accident, and thereafter dismissed his suit 
against defendant, trial court properly 
deducted such sum from judgment ren-
dered against remaining codefendants. 
Green v. Lang Co., Inc., 115 U. 528, 206 P. 
2d 626. 
4. Effect of release of one joint debtor. 
This statute permits plaintiff who has 
not been fully compensated to release one 
of several defendants without releasing 
others by expressly and in writing reserv-
ing his rights against such others, with in-
cidental provision that payments received 
from released one shall be credited to 
others, unless there exists between obli-
gors some relationship which would make 
such credit inequitable. Greenhalch v. 
Shell Oil Co., 78 F. 2d 942. 
Where plaintiff released defendant in 
personal injury suit reserving only his 
right against physician for careless treat-
ment, held such release discharged another 
defendant whose connection with the prem-· 
ises, the defective condition of which re-
sulted in injury, was unknown to plaintiff 
at time release was drawn. Greenhalch v. 
Shell Oil Co., 78 F. 2d 942. 
Generally discharge of one joint debtor 
discharges his co-joint debtor; as, for ex-
ample, where there is a payment or accord 
and satisfaction. Rocky Mountain Stud 
Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 U. 299, 316, 151 P. 
521. 
5. Full a.mount accepted. 
This section was not applicable, where 
plaintiff's acceptance of full amount which 
he could have recovered from joint tort-
fea.sors, had they both been liable, ex-
tinguished his cause of action. Dawson v. 
Board of Education of Weber County 
School Dist., 118 U. 452, 222 P. 2d 590. 
6. Covenant not to sue. 
A covenant not to sue one joint and 
several obligor does not release the re-
maining obligors. Bergeson v. Life Ins. 
Corp. of America, 170 F. Supp. 150. 
7. Satisfaction of judgment. 
Satisfaction of judgment against one of 
two or more joint and several obligors will 
bar an action against the remaining obli-
gors. Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Amer-
ica, 170 F. Supp. 150. 
Collateral References. 
Paymente=:>51. 
70 C.J.S. Payment § 40. 
15-4-4. Release of co-obligor-Reservation of rights.-Subject to the 
prov1S1ons of section 15-4-3, the obligee's release or discharge of one or 
more of several obligors, or of one or more of joint or of joint and several 
obligors, shall not discharge co-obligors against whom the obligee in 
writing and as part of the same transaction as the release or discharge ex-
pressly reserves his rights; and in the absence of such a reservation of 
rights shall discharge co-obligors only to the extent provided in section 
15-4-5. 
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15-4-5 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 4; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 47-0-4. 
Compiler's Note. 
The references in this section to "section 
15-4-3" and "section 15-4-5" appeared in 
Code 1943 as "section 47-0-3" and "section 
47-0-5" respectively. 
1. In general. 
Applied in Plateau Uranium Investment 
Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326 
P. 2d 1022. 
2. Covenant not to sue. 
Under a settlement between plaintiff 
and defendant, a mail carrier, in which 
plaintiff did not give an outright release 
from liability to the defendant, but exe-
cuted a covenant not to sue, wherein the 
right to proceed against the United States 
under the Tort Claims Act was specifically 
reserved, the settlement did not bar re-
covery against the United States. United 
States v. First Security Bank, 208 F. 2d 
424, 428, 42 A. L. R. 2d 951. 
3. Effect of release in Federal Tort Claims 
case. 
The release of an airlines by the widow 
of a passenger who was killed in a collision 
operated to release the United States from 
claim based on the negligence of its em-
ployees in giving directions and failing to 
warn airliners. Matland v. United States, 
285 F. 2d 752. 
Collateral References. 
Release€=>29 (2). 
76 C.J.S. Release § 48. 
Agreement with one tort-feasor that any 
judgment that may be recovered will not 
be enforced against him, as affecting lia-
bility of co-tort-feasor, 160 A. L. R. 870. 
Creditor's reservation of rights against 
surety in releasing or extending time to 
principal debtor, 139 A. L. R. 85. 
Discharge or settlement by, or payment 
to, one partner, or co-obligee, as affecting 
rights of others, 142 A. L. R. 371. 
Release of one responsible for injury as 
affecting liability of physician or surgeon 
for negligent treatment of injury, 40 A. 
L. R. 2d 1075. 
Release of, or covenant not to sue, one 
primarily liable for tort but expressly re-
serving rights against one secondarily 
liable, as bar to recovery against latter, 
20 A. L. R. 2d 1044. 
15-4-5. Release of co-obligor-Effect of knowledge of obligee.-If an 
obligee releasing or discharging an obligor without express reservation of 
rights against a co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that the 
obligor released or discharged did not pay as much of the claim as he 
was bound by his contract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the 
obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to the amount 
which the obligee knew or had reason to know that the released or dis-
charged obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay. 
If an obligee so releasing or discharging an obligor has not then such 
knowledge or reason to know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor 
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely: ( a) 
the amount of the fractional share of the obligor released or discharged, 
or (b) the amount that such obligor was bound by his contract or relation 
with the co-obligor to pay. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 5; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 47-0-5. 
1. In general. 
Applied in Plateau Uranium Investment 
Corp. v. Sugar & Ulmer, 8 U. (2d) 5, 326 
P. 2d 1022. 
Collateral References. 
Release€=>29(2). 
76 C.J.S. Release § 48. 
15-4-6. Death of joint obligor-Survivorship.-On the death of a joint 
obligor in contract his executor or administrator shall be bound as such 
jointly and severally with the surviving obligor or obligors. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 6; R. S. 1933 Collateral References. 
& C. 1943, 47-0-6. Contracts(s::;;>182(2). 
17 C.J.S. Contracts § 353. 
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15-4-7. Effective date of chapter.-This chapter shall not apply to obli-
gations arising prior to July 1, 1929. 
History: L. 1929, ch. 61, § 7; R. S. 1933 Compiler's Note. 
& C. 1943, 47-0-7. The reference in this section to "this 
chapter" appeared in the Code 1943 as 
"this title." 
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